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MCDONALD V. CHICAGO: WHICH STANDARD OF
SCRUTINY SHOULD APPLY TO GUN-CONTROL
LAWS?
Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm**
Introduction
In this debate, Professors Rosenthal and Malcolm debate the standard
of scrutiny that the Supreme Court should apply to restrictions on the
Second Amendment in the wake of its recent decision, McDonald v. City of
Chicago. Professor Rosenthal begins Part I by noting the importance of
gun-control laws to police; he considers a lower standard of scrutiny necessary to allow law enforcement officials to protect the community. Turning
to the practical consequences of Chicago and Washington, D.C.'s recent
gun-control laws, which make owning a gun nearly impossible in those cities, Professor Malcolm argues for a standard of strict scrutiny for all guncontrol laws in Part II. Finally, in Part III, Professor Rosenthal replies.
I.

Second Amendment Plumbing After McDonald: Exploring the
Contradiction in the Second Amendment
Lawrence Rosenthal

It took two landmark decisions to reach the end of the beginning. In
District of Columbia v. Heller,1 the Supreme Court, adopting what it characterized as ―the original understanding of the Second Amendment,‖2 held
that the Second Amendment secures an individual‘s right to keep and bear
arms against the federal government. On that basis, the Court invalidated
the District of Columbia‘s prohibition on the possession of handguns.3 In
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1
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (link).
2
Id. at 2816.
3
Id. at 2817–22.
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McDonald v. City of Chicago,4 the Court concluded that by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms is enforceable against state and local governments.5 Now, the more
prosaic but perhaps more important work begins. It is time to start putting
the doctrinal ―plumbing‖ in place.6
A.
Likely the most important piece of plumbing that will need to be installed is the standard of scrutiny to be applied to gun-control laws challenged under the Second Amendment. This is no small matter. As Eugene
Volokh has observed, given the many difficulties in assessing the efficacy
of gun-control laws, it is enormously difficult to produce empirical support
for gun-control regulations, and therefore a rigorous form of strict scrutiny,
requiring the government to demonstrate that a challenged regulation is the
essential means for achieving a compelling governmental interest, would
likely be the death knell for most gun-control laws.7
The Supreme Court has not yet offered much guidance on the Second
Amendment standard of scrutiny. In Heller, the Court invalidated the District‘s ban on handguns and its requirement that all firearms in a home remain unloaded and inoperable,8 but refused to decide what type of
justification is required for firearms regulation, although it did reject a test
limited to ascertaining whether a challenged regulation lacks a rational basis, as well as Justice Breyer‘s proposed interest-balancing test.9 In McDonald, the Court was silent on the Second Amendment standard of scrutiny,
with a four-justice plurality adding only that Fourteenth Amendment standards for state and local gun-control laws are no different than those applied
to the federal government under the Second Amendment.10 Since Heller,
4

130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
Id. at 3050 (plurality opinion) (relying on the Due Process Clause); id. at 3077–88 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (relying on the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
6
For the source of the metaphor, see Stuart Banner, The Second Amendment, So Far, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 898, 90708 (2004) (reviewing DAVID C. WILLIAMS, THE MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT: TAMING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC (2003)).
7
See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 146568 (2009). For a helpful discussion of the difficulties in assembling empirical evidence of the efficacy of gun-control laws, see MARK
V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN‘T END THE BATTLE OVER GUNS 77–85
(2007).
8
128 S. Ct. at 2817–19 (link).
9
Id. at 2817 n.27, 2821.
10
130 S. Ct. at 3048 (plurality opinion). Justice Thomas‘s separate opinion suggests this symmetry
as well, see id. at 3083 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), although he left
open the question whether noncitizens may assert Second Amendment rights against state and local governments. See id. at 3083 n.19. To be sure, a majority characterized the right to keep and bear arms as
―fundamental,‖ see id. at 3041–42, and there is authority suggesting that burdens on rights regarded as
fundamental should be subject to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972)
5

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/24/
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commentators have sharply divided on the appropriate standard for scrutiny
under the Second Amendment,11 as have the lower courts.12
To make matters more concrete, consider the potential Second
Amendment right to carry firearms in public. The Second Amendment
provides: ―A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.‖13 In Heller, the Court cautioned that:
‗[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and
ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.‘ Normal
meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but
it excludes secret or technical meanings that would not

(link); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 3031 (1968) (link). This rule, however, is not invariably applied. See Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 696700
(2007). More important for present purposes, we will see that the Second Amendment contains a textual
basis for regulatory authority that makes strict scrutiny unwarranted. See infra Part II.
11
See, e.g., Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Scope of the Second Amendment RightPost-Heller Standard of
Review, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 43, 66–71 (2009) (enhanced rational basis review); Carlton F.W. Larson,
Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1379–80 (2009) (something less than strict scrutiny); Calvin Massey, Second
Amendment Decision Rules, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1431, 1442–43 (2009) (regulation must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence to advance a compelling governmental interest); Lawrence Rosenthal,
Second Amendment Plumbing after Heller: Of Standards of Scrutiny, Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. LAW. 1, 79–84 (2009) (undue burden test); Allen Rostron,
Protecting Gun Rights and Improving Gun Control after District of Columbia v. Heller, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 383, 407–08 (2009) (reasonableness test) ); Mark Tushnet, District of Columbia v. Heller and the Perils of Compromise, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419, 423–32 (2009) (strict scrutiny); Volokh, supra note 7, at 1454–61 (regulations imposing a substantial burden on Second Amendment rights
should be evaluated by assessing the ―magnitude of the burden‖ in light of its justification); Jason T.
Anderson, Note, Second Amendment Standards of Review: What the Supreme Court Left Unanswered in
District of Columbia v. Heller, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 547, 577–87 (2009) (intermediate scrutiny); Ryan L.
Card, Note, An Opinion Without Standards: The Supreme Court’s Refusal to Adopt a Standard of Constitutional Review in District of Columbia v. Heller Will Likely Cause Headaches for Future Judicial
Review of Gun-Control Regulations, 23 B.Y.U. J. PUB. INT. L. 259, 286–87 (2009) (same); Lindsay
Goldberg, Note, District of Columbia v. Heller: Failing to Establish a Standard for the Future, 68 MD.
L. REV. 889, 904–13 (2009) (strict scrutiny); Andrew R. Gould, Comment, The Hidden Second Amendment Framework within District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1535, 1570–73 (2009) (a ―deferential form of strict scrutiny‖); Sarah Perkins, Note, District of Columbia v. Heller: The Second
Amendment Shoots One Down, 70 LA. L. REV. 1061, 107990 (2010) (intermediate scrutiny); Jason Racine, Note, What the Hell[er]? The Fine Print Standard of Review under Heller, 29 N. ILL. U.L. REV.
605, 617–20 (2009) (undue burden).
12
For a recent decision usefully summarizing the disarray in the lower courts, see Heller v. District
of Columbia, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 184–86 (D.D.C. 2010) (link). In the most extensive discussion of the
issue to date at the appellate level, the Seventh Circuit recently held that the Second Amendment requires a form of intermediate scrutiny such that the challenged regulation be substantially related to a an
important governmental objective. See United States v. Skoien, No. 08-3770, 2010 WL 2735747, at *3
(7th Cir. July 13, 2010) (en banc) (link).
13
U.S. CONST. amend. II (link).
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have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.14
The Court then relied on framing-era sources to define the term ―arms‖
as ―weapons . . . ‗in common use at the time‘‖;15 the right to ―keep‖ arms as
the right to possess them;16 and the right to ―bear‖ arms as the right to ―carry[] for a particular purpose—confrontation.‖17 The Second Amendment
provides that these rights ―shall not be infringed.‖ According to perhaps the
leading framing-era dictionary, Noah Webster‘s 1828 American Dictionary
of the English Language, ―infringed‖ meant ―[b]roken, violated, transgressed,‖18 which seems to support a vigorous conception of an individual
right to possess and carry firearms.19 Indeed, in Heller, while noting in dicta that ―the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held
that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the
Second Amendment or state analogues,‖20 the Court added that antebellum
nineteenth-century cases had understood the Second Amendment to secure
a right to carry firearms openly.21 Professor Volokh, even while rejecting
strict scrutiny of gun-control laws, has opined that Heller likely secures a
right to carry loaded firearms in public, at least openly.22 He has also expressed doubt about prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons, stating
that there is not much beyond the Heller dictum and their historical pedigree to support these laws.23 I have also expressed doubts about whether
these laws can survive Heller.24
The consequences for urban law enforcement are potentially serious.
As I have demonstrated elsewhere, the unprecedented spike in violent crime
from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s was largely a function of urban firearms-related crime in disadvantaged and unstable inner-city neighborhoods,
arising from competition in emerging markets for crack cocaine.25 The ability of gang members and drug traffickers ―to possess and carry weapons in

14
128 S. Ct. at 2788 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)
(brackets in original)) (link).
15
Id. at 2817 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).
16
Id. at 2792.
17
Id. at 2793.
18
1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 110 (1828).
19
See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS‘ SECOND AMENDMENT: ORIGINS OF THE
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 328–30 (2008); David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1359, 1404–09.
20
128 S. Ct. at 2816.
21
Id. at 2809.
22
See Volokh, supra note 7, at 1516–20.
23
See id. at 1521–24.
24
Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 45–47.
25
See id. at 7–15.
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case of confrontation‖26 was central to this violent competition, since the
creation and control of territorial drug-distribution monopolies involved the
ready availability of firearms.27 There is, in turn, substantial evidence that
the large declines in urban crime that followed the crime spike were attributable to aggressive stop-and-frisk tactics, which made it far riskier to carry guns and drugs in public.28 Prohibitions on carrying weapons, in turn,
played an important role in these police tactics, since they confer upon police a critical source of stop-and-frisk authority whenever officers reasonably suspect a suspect to be carrying a firearm.29 Recognition of a
constitutional right to carry firearms, at least openly, would grant drug traffickers and gang members effective immunity from stop-and-frisk tactics,
potentially crippling the fight against urban violent crime.30
26

D. C. v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008).
See Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 15–20.
28
See id. at 30–35.
29
See id. at 37–44.
30
See id. at 45–48. One article questions this conclusion, speculating that police would respond to a
constitutional right to carry firearms by utilizing alternate grounds for stop-and-frisk, ―such as suspicion
of drug crimes or even curfew violations,‖ or relying on an ―officer safety justification.‖ Philip J. Cook,
Jens Ludwig, & Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control after Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1080 n.214 (2009). This speculation rests on an assumption
that there is some sort of equilibrium of reasonable suspicion such that if one basis for suspicion becomes unavailable to officers, they can always shift to another. The authors offer no support for this assumption, however, and there is little basis to suppose that when one justification for stop-and-frisk is
eliminated, police can always come up with another. Given that police in departments committed to aggressive stop-and-frisk already have an incentive to maximize stop-and-frisk rates, it is doubtful that a
reduction in stop-and-frisk authority of one type will be offset by increasing stop-and-frisk authority on
other grounds. The available data, moreover, shows that weapons searches are an especially important
source of stop-and-frisk authority for departments that use stop-and-frisk tactics aggressively. For example, in New York, in an 18-month period studied by the Attorney General during the crime-decline
period, stop-and-frisks reflected in mandated reports based on suspected weapons offenses made up
44.6% of all stops, while suspected drug offenses were involved in 8.4% and misdemeanor/quality of
life offenses were involved in 7.7%. CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, OFFICE OF ATT‘Y GEN. OF THE STATE OF
N.Y., THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT‘S ―STOP AND FRISK‖ PRACTICES app. tbl. I.A.5 (Dec.
1, 1999), available at GOOGLE BOOKS, http://books.google.com (search ―new york attorney general stop
and frisk report methodology and appendices‖) (link). Reports are mandated ―when a suspect is (i)
‗stopped‘ by the use of force; (ii) frisked (i.e., patdown) and/or ‗searched‘ (i.e., searched inside clothing); (iii) arrested; or (iv) ‗stopped‘ and the suspect refused to identify him or herself.‖ Id. at 6364 (internal footnotes and underlining omitted). For all reports, even if not mandated, 19.2% are based on
suspicion of violent crime; 34.0% on weapons offenses; 15.8% on property crime; 8.7% on drug offenses; and 10.2% on misdemeanor/quality of life offenses. Id. at 10910 & tbl. I.A.5. Moreover, there
is no free-floating authority consistent with the Fourth Amendment to stop and frisk an individual based
on ―officer safety‖ absent reasonable suspicion that the suspect is engaged in unlawful activity. The rule
permitting a stop-and-frisk based on reasonable suspicion permits an officer to approach a suspect ―for
purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior . . . .‖ Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (link).
This requirement is fully applicable to stop-and-frisk involving suspected firearms. See, e.g., Florida v.
J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (―Our decisions recognize the serious threat that armed criminals pose to
public safety; Terry‘s rule, which permits protective police searches on the basis of reasonable suspicion
rather than demanding that officers meet the higher standard of probable cause, responds to this very
concern. But an automatic firearm exception to our established reliability analysis would rove too far.‖)
27
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Thus, the stakes are high. A vigorous conception of Second Amendment rights could enable urban street gangs to act as occupying armies. As
long as they commit no overt crimes while police officers are present, they
could use their ability to go about armed to establish criminal mini-states
based on drug trafficking—much as they did during the crime-spike era.31
Everything depends on the type of justification that courts will require to
regulate the possession of guns.32
B.
At first blush, Heller seems to clinch the case for a right of gang members and drug dealers to carry firearms. As we have seen, Heller defined
(citation omitted) (link). Thus, Terry requires suspicion of illegality; it follows that when applicable law
does not ban carrying a firearm, the Fourth Amendment does not permit a stop-and-frisk for firearms,
because there is no reason to believe that the suspect violated any law. See, e.g., United States v. Burton, 228 F.3d 524, 528–30 (4th Cir. 2000) (link); United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217–18 (3d Cir.
2000) (link); Gomez v. United States, 597 A.2d 884, 890–91 (D.C. 1991) (link); Commonwealth v. Couture, 552 N.E.2d 538, 541 (Mass. 1990) (link); 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.6(a) (4th ed. 2004). Heller leaves open the possibility of
requiring a license to carry firearms, see 128 S. Ct. at 2819, but in the context of vehicles, the Court has
held that the Fourth Amendment forbids investigative stops to check the license and registration of a vehicle absent some particularized reason to believe that the suspect has violated licensing requirements or
another law. See Del. v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 65563 (1979) (link); see also City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 4048 (2000) (invalidating roadblocks to check vehicles for guns and drugs in
high-crime areas) (link).
31
See Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 1114, 4548.
32
Some have argued that the Second Amendment right should be limited to possessing and using
firearms within one‘s home, since privacy interests subside and governmental regulatory interests are
greater once firearms are taken outside the home. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect a
Right to Carry Guns Outside the Home?, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 23133 (2008); Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1297–
1355 (2009). Whatever the merits of this view in terms of policy, however, it is hard to reconcile with
Heller‘s textualism. As we have seen, Heller defined the right to bear arms to include carrying them for
purposes of confrontation, and it does not seem particularly plausible to understand this analysis of the
text as recognizing only a right to ―bear‖ arms from the bedroom to the living room. For additional critical discussion of this understanding of Second Amendment rights, see Eugene Volokh, The First and
Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97 (2009) (link). Others have argued that Second
Amendment doctrine should adopt the rule found in First Amendment doctrine that permits reasonable
regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech and apply it to the right to keep and bear arms. See,
e.g., Christopher A. Chrisman, Mind the Gap: The Missing Standard of Review under the Second
Amendment (and Where to Find It), 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 289 (2006); Janice Baker, Comment, The
Next Step in Second Amendment Analysis: Incorporating the Right to Bear Arms into the Fourteenth
Amendment, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 35, 57–60 (2002); Gary E. Barnett, Note, The Reasonable Regulation of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 6 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL‘Y 607, 621–28 (2008). Yet, the analogy between First and Second Amendment rights is a difficult one because ―the right to arms stems from
concerns about self defense and the defense of public liberty . . . . [T]he Second Amendment‘s right to
arms is about capabilities more than expression.‖ Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Guns and Gay Sex: Some
Notes on Firearms, the Second Amendment, and “Reasonable Regulation”, 75 TENN. L. REV. 137, 147–
48 (2007) (footnote omitted). Beyond that, First Amendment doctrine treats deferentially laws directed
not at the content of speech but rather some nonspeech evil, whereas gun-control laws are usually directed at the right to keep and bear arms as defined in Heller. See Tushnet, supra note 11, at 429–31.
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the right to ―bear‖ arms as a right to carry firearms for purposes of confrontation. The Court did not define the right in terms limited to those who carry for purposes of legitimate self-defense; indeed, it explained that the term
includes ―the carrying of the weapon . . . for the purpose of ‗offensive or defensive action,‘‖33 adopting a definition of ―carry‖ originally used in connection with a federal statute that enhances sentences for anyone who
―during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime
. . . uses or carries a firearm.‖34 Thus, it seems that even the criminallyminded have a right to ―bear‖ arms.
Yet there is more going on in Heller than first meets the eye. The
Court was rigorously textualist when defining the right to ―keep and bear
arms,‖ but when it considered whether the District of Columbia‘s handgun
ban ran afoul of the Second Amendment, the Court found that textualism
offered little assistance. Instead of making an effort to determine whether a
handgun ban ―infringed‖ the right to keep and bear arms in light of the original meaning of that term, the Court approached the question in a more indirect way, perhaps recognizing that the term ―infringed‖ is ambiguous as
applied to a law that permits the District‘s residents to possess some types
of ―arms‖ but not others. The Court wrote that ―[t]he handgun ban amounts
to a prohibition of an entire class of ‗arms‘ that is overwhelmingly chosen
by American society for that lawful purpose,‖ and ―extends, moreover, to
the home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most
acute.‖35 It added that ―[f]ew laws in the history of our Nation have come
close to the severe restriction of the District‘s handgun ban. And some of
those few have been struck down.‖36 Handguns, the Court wrote, are considered ―the quintessential self-defense weapon.‖37 The Court also characterized a number of firearms regulations as ―presumptively lawful,‖38
including ―prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons,‖ and ―prohibitions
on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings . . . .‖39
Commentators have suggested that the Court took a categorical approach in which ―core‖ Second Amendment interests receive something
close to absolute protection, while more penumbral interests are subject to

33
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2793 (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
34
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006) (link).
35
128 S. Ct. at 2817.
36
Id. at 2818.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 2817 n.26.
39
Id. at 2816–17.
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greater regulation.40 Still, it is far from clear how to go about determining
whether a challenged regulation implicates only penumbral interests. Framing-era practice appears to be of little help. Not only did the Court claim no
historical support for a core-and-penumbra approach, but it acknowledged
that there was little framing-era support for firearms regulation aside from
laws addressing gunpowder storage and the discharge of firearms.41 Nevertheless, the Court treated some regulations that lack support in framing-era
practice as presumptively lawful. Prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons, for example, did not emerge until the 1820s and 1830s in response to
a surge in violent crime in the nation‘s growing cities.42 Prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by convicted felons were uncommon until they
emerged in the twentieth century in response to a crime wave that followed
the First World War.43 For this reason, some have denounced the Court‘s
treatment of these ―presumptively lawful‖ regulations as inconsistent with
the Court‘s originalist analysis.44
Perhaps Heller’s dicta regarding presumptively lawful firearms regulation will one day be discarded as inconsistent with the original meaning of
the Second Amendment. After all, in the operative clause, the only term
that could be thought to support a regulation of the right to ―carry‖ ―in case
of confrontation‖ is the term ―infringed,‖ and, as we have seen, that term, at
least as a matter of its common framing-era usage, does not appear to allow
regulatory power over the right to bear arms. There is, however, a textual
basis for regulatory authority—the Second Amendment‘s preamble; in particular, its reference to ―[a] well regulated militia.‖
In Heller, the Court explained that the original meaning of the term
―militia‖ was not the members of a formal military organization, but rather
―the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the
sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty.‖45 The
Court therefore concluded that the original meaning of the term included all
40

See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 404–11 (2009); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 976–77 (2009) (link).
41
128 S. Ct. at 2819–21.
42
See, e.g., SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 138–44 (2006); Saul Cornell, The Early American Origins of
the Modern Gun Control Debate: The Right to Bear Arms, Firearms Regulation, and the Lessons of History, 17 STAN. L. & POL‘Y REV. 571, 582–85 (2006).
43
See C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y
695, 698–728 (2009).
44
See, e.g., Larson, supra note 11, at 1372–79; Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and
Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1356–62 (2009).
45
128 S. Ct. at 2817. The dissenters added that the first militia act, enacted the same year the
Second Amendment was ratified, defined the militia as ―every able-bodied white male citizen between
the ages of 18 and 45‖ and required each ―to ‗provide himself with a good musket or firelock‘ and other
specified weaponry.‖ Id. at 2842 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (quoting Act of May 8,
1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271).
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those ―physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense,‖46
rather than being limited to ―the organized militia.‖47 The Court breezed
past the adjective ―well-regulated,‖ writing that it ―implies nothing more
than the imposition of proper discipline and training.‖48 But, we should
pause to consider the interaction between noun ―militia‖ and its adjective,
―well-regulated.‖ If the militia includes everyone capable of bearing arms,
even if not part of an organized militia, and the government may subject
this unorganized ―militia‖ to ―proper training and discipline,‖ then the
preamble envisions comprehensive regulation of all who possess and carry
firearms, not merely those in formal military or paramilitary organizations.
After all, the word ―militia‖ appears only once in the Second Amendment,
and if it includes all who are capable of bearing arms even if not part of an
organized military organization, then this same group is subject to regulatory authority. Accordingly, the regulatory power envisioned in the preamble
extends to the whole of the populace capable of exercising Second
Amendment rights. Moreover, Heller adds that the preamble is properly
consulted to clarify the meaning of the Second Amendment‘s operative
clause.49
Accordingly, the Second Amendment, construed in light of the preamble, recognizes a general regulatory power over the possession and carrying
of firearms (although presumably the source of regulatory authority would
be found outside of the preamble, such as state and local police powers or
the federal power to regulate interstate commerce). For this reason, it is appropriate to construe the term ―infringed‖ in the Second Amendment‘s
operative clause in a manner that preserves the regulatory power acknowledged in the preamble. This approach, in turn, does a great deal to explain
the basis for the Court characterizing as ―presumptively lawful,‖ regulations
that would otherwise seem to ―infringe‖ the right to ―possess‖ firearms or
―carry in case of confrontation,‖ such as laws forbidding concealed carry.
To be sure, one could argue that regulatory power under the Second
Amendment is limited to the eighteenth-century regulations extant at the
time of the Second Amendment‘s ratification, but that rationale is not only
inconsistent with Heller‘s dicta, but also fails to take adequate account of
McDonald. In McDonald, a majority of the Court concluded that the
Second Amendment must be understood as it had come to be regarded at
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s ratification.50 By then, of course,
there was the widespread acceptance of prohibitions on concealed carrying
46

Id. at 2799.
Id. at 2800.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 2789–90.
50
See 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3038–42 (2010). For elaboration on the argument that the Second Amendment‘s incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the Second Amendment be interpreted as it was understood at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s adoption, see AKHIL REED
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 258–66 (1998).
47
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of firearms,51 as Heller acknowledged.52 It follows that by the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it was understood that under the Second
Amendment, regulatory powers were not static, and could expand in response to felt exigencies such as the wave of urban crime in the 1820s and
1830s that produced the first concealed carry prohibitions in America.53
Thus, even though the Court rejected an interest-balancing test in Heller,54 a point reiterated in the four-justice plurality opinion in McDonald,55
the historical acceptance of concealed-carry prohibitions cannot be explained by anything other than this very type of interest-balancing—an approach that does not require the kind of compelling empirical evidence of
necessity that the strict scrutiny test demands. Despite Heller, interestbalancing may be inescapable in Second Amendment jurisprudence.56 To
avoid the need to repudiate what seems like a clear statement to the contrary
in Heller, the Court may utilize a different form of words, such as an undue
burden test, but in the practical operation, its approach is likely to be little
different.57 No other provision of the Bill of Rights contains the type of textual acknowledgement of governmental regulatory power found in the
Second Amendment. It would be anomalous, to say the least, for the Court
to recognize less regulatory power with respect to Second Amendment
rights than is generally acknowledged with respect to the rest of the Bill of
Rights.58
C.
Even granting that prohibitions on carrying concealed firearms are
likely to survive under some version of an undue burden or interestbalancing test, the question remains whether the Second Amendment grants
a right to carry firearms openly—a right that could effectively immunize
51
See, e.g., ALEXANDER DECONDE, GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 7174 (2001); HALBROOK, supra
note 19, at 93–96; Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American Origins
of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 516–17 (2004); David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen
Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 559, 615–17
(1986); Kopel, supra note 19, at 1416–33; Calvin Massey, Guns, Extremists, and the Constitution, 57
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095, 1115–18 (2000).
52
See 128 S. Ct. at 2816.
53
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
54
128 S. Ct. at 2821.
55
130 S. Ct. at 3050.
56
See Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1569–73 (2009).
57
One student commentator discounted the possibility that the Court will adopt an undue burden
test on the ground that this test has been repudiated by Justices Scalia and Thomas as a matter of due
process jurisprudence. See Gould, supra note 11, at 1573–75. Nevertheless, a majority of the remaining
justices might well unite behind this approach, and even Justice Scalia and Thomas have proven willing
to subscribe to this test when it was necessary to assemble a majority behind a result which they otherwise approved. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 162627, 162839 (2007) (link).
58
For a discussion that considers the appropriate standard of scrutiny for the Second Amendment in
light of those employed for other provisions in the Bill of Rights, see Winkler, supra note 10, at 693–96.
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urban gangs from stop-and-frisk tactics, at least for gang members who are
not convicted felons or not otherwise subject to the regulatory powers acknowledged as legitimate in Heller. After all, an undue burden test cannot
render a right nugatory, and as Heller defined the right to bear arms, it
seems inescapable that some sort of right to carry firearms—at least in nonsensitive public places—must be recognized if the right to ―bear‖ arms is to
avoid becoming superfluous in light of the right to ―keep‖ them. Now, we
have finally reached the essential contradiction in the Second Amendment
as applied to contemporary urban America.
While Heller characterized the right to keep and bear arms as an aspect
of what was regarded in the framing era as a natural right of self-defense,59
in contemporary America, a right to keep and bear arms does not necessarily enhance security. Research discloses, for example, that gang members
carry firearms at significantly elevated rates.60 Yet their ability to defend
themselves does not make gang members safer; instead, they face an
enormous risk of violent victimization. For example, a study of Los Angeles County gang members during the crime-rise period estimated that
they were sixty times more likely to be homicide victims than were members of the general population.61 A study of gang members in St. Louis
found a homicide rate 1,000 times higher than that of the general population.62 A study of a large African-American drug trafficking gang found
that over a four-year period, gang members had a 25% chance of being
killed.63
The prevalence of violence in gang-dominated neighborhoods, moreover, serves to make firearms more pervasive in those communities, as the
perception of danger in high-crime neighborhoods becomes a further stimulus to carry a gun as a means of self-protection.64 As Jeffrey Fagan and
Deanna Wilkinson‘s study of at-risk youth in New York explains, when inner-city youth live under the threat of violence in an environment in which
firearms are prevalent, not only are they more likely to arm themselves, but
they become increasingly likely to respond to real or perceived threats and
provocations with lethal violence, creating what the authors characterize as
a contagion effect.65 There are statistical indications of contagion as well.
59

128 S. Ct. at 2793–94, 2798–99, 2805, 2807.
See Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 18–19.
61
Armando Morales, A Clinical Model for the Prevention of Gang Violence and Homicide, in
SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND GANG VIOLENCE 105, 111–12 (Richard C. Cervantes ed., 1992).
62
SCOTT H. DECKER & BARRIK VAN WINKLE, LIFE IN THE GANG: FAMILY, FRIENDS, AND
VIOLENCE 173 (1996).
63
See Sudhir Venkatesh, The Financial Activity of a Modern American Street Gang, in AMERICAN
YOUTH GANGS AT THE MILLENNIUM 239, 242 (Finn-Aage Esbensen et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter
YOUTH GANGS AT THE MILLENIUM]
64
See Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 19–20.
65
Jeffrey Fagan & Deanna L. Wilkinson, Guns, Youth Violence, and Social Identity in Inner Cities,
24 CRIME & JUST., 1998, at 105, 137–75. For similar accounts, see, for example, MARK R. POGREBIN,
PAUL B. STRETESKY & N. PRABHA UNNITHAN, GUNS, VIOLENCE & CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR: THE
60
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A number of studies found that gang-related homicides have an independent and positive effect on the homicide rate.66 One study of homicide in
New York, for example, found evidence of a contagion effect of firearmsrelated violence, which stimulated additional firearms violence in nearby
areas.67 In such an environment, the prevalence of firearms, rather than enhancing security, compromises it.68
Consider the drive-by shooting, which gang researchers note is unusually common in gang-related shootings.69 Drive-bys accounted for 33%
of gang-related homicides in Los Angeles County between 1989 and 1993,
with 590 victims; nearly half of the persons shot at and a quarter of the homicide victims were innocent bystanders.70 The frequency with which innocent bystanders are shot illustrates the disadvantage of a drive-by
shooting—it is not easy to hit the intended target from a moving vehicle.
The tactic makes sense, however, in light of the rate at which gang members carry firearms. As we have seen, with gang membership comes firearms, and if gang members believe that their targets are likely to be armed,
OFFENDER‘S PERSPECTIVE 69–71 (2009); David Hemenway et al., Gun Carrying Among Adolescents,
59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 44–47 (1996).
66
See, e.g., Jacqueline Cohen & George Tita, Diffusion in Homicide: Exploring a General Method
for Detecting Spatial Diffusion Processes, 15 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 451, 490–91 (1999);
Jacqueline Cohen et al., The Role of Drug Markets and Gangs in Local Homicide Rates, 2 HOMICIDE
STUDS. 241, 257–58 (1998).
67
See Jeffrey Fagan, Deanna L. Wilkinson & Garth Davies, Social Contagion of Violence, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR AND AGGRESSION 688, 701–10 (Daniel J. Flannery et
al. eds., 2007). For a similar finding about Chicago, see Elizabeth Griffiths & Jorge M. Chavez, Communities, Street Guns and Homicide Trajectories in Chicago, 1980-1995: Merging Methods for Examining Homicide Trends Across Space and Time, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 941, 965–69 (2004).
68
Some have claimed that laws entitling individuals to carry concealed firearms produced reductions in crime. See, e.g., JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME 170–336 (3d ed. 2010). This
conclusion, however, has been subject to fierce criticism. See, e.g., NAT‘L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 125–51 (Charles F. Wellford et al eds., 2005); DAVID
HEMENWAY, PRIVATE GUNS PUBLIC HEALTH 100–04 (2004); TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 85–95; Ian
Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Yet Another Refutation of the More Guns, Less Crime Hypothesis With
Some Help from Moody and Marvell, 6 ECON J. WATCH 35 (2009) (link). In any event, even the advocates of this view make no claim that it applies in high-crime urban neighborhoods. Another argument
used by firearms proponents—although not linked to declining crime rates—is that firearms are used for
defensive purposes at very high rates. See, e.g., Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime:
The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150 (1995).
More recent work has cast great doubt on this claim. See, e.g., PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, U.S.
DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, GUNS IN AMERICA: NATIONAL SURVEY ON PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND USE OF
FIREARMS 8–11 (May 1997) (link); HEMENWAY, supra, at 66–69, 239–40.
69
See, e.g., MALCOLM W. KLEIN, THE AMERICAN STREET GANG 117–18 (1995); Deanna L. Wilkinson & Jeffrey Fagan, The Role of Firearms in Violence “Scripts”: The Dynamics of Gun Events
Among Adolescent Males, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 70 (1996).
70
See H. Range Hutson et al., Drive-by Shootings by Violent Street Gangs in Los Angeles: A Fiveyear Review from 1989 to 1993, 3 ACADEMIC EMERGENCY MED. 300, 302 (1996). In 1991, there were
more than 1,500 gang-related drive-by shootings in Los Angeles. H. Range Hutson et al., Adolescents
and Children Injured or Killed in Drive-By Shootings in Los Angeles, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 324, 324
(1994).
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the drive-by tactic often constitutes the safest way of approaching one‘s target and then making a getaway.71
These are the consequences of a right to ―carry in case of confrontation‖ in high-crime, inner-city neighborhoods. They lay bare the contradiction within the Second Amendment. In the framing era, it may have been
possible to speak of a ―right to keep and bear arms‖ that was ―necessary to
the security of a free state,‖ but in high-crime inner-city neighborhoods, this
formula does not hold. At a minimum, keeping the ―militia‖ ―well regulated‖ is likely to require a great deal more in the way of regulation than in
the framing era. Perhaps a demanding and highly discretionary system of
carry permits, similar to that employed by New York City, 72 could lend
some substance to a right to ―bear‖ arms without threatening urban mayhem, but it is doubtful that high-crime urban areas could go much further
without reinstating the dynamics that led to the crime spike of the late
1980s and early 1990s.73 Such are the problems when an eighteenth-century
right is applied in the twenty-first century. Even so, concern about the consequences of a right to bear arms in urban America is more than a policy
objection to a constitutional command which a Court can properly brush
aside;74 it is a concern that the Second Amendment‘s preamble requires us
to keep in mind.
How then, are we to resolve the contradiction within the Second
Amendment? It seems that only the still-unresolved Second Amendment
standard of scrutiny can do the critical work.

71
See WILLIAM B. SANDERS, GANGBANGS AND DRIVE-BYS: GROUNDED CULTURE AND JUVENILE
GANG VIOLENCE 65–74 (1994); James C. Howell, Youth Gangs: An Overview, in YOUTH GANGS AT
THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 63, at 16, 36–37.
72
In New York, state law prohibits possession of a handgun without a license and generally requires that handguns be kept within the licensee‘s home or place of business except for those engaged in
law enforcement. See N.Y. PENAL LAWS § 400.00(2) (McKinney 2008) (link). In New York City, an
additional permit must be obtained to possess or carry a handgun. See id. § 400.00(6). The issuance of
these permits is highly discretionary, and generally requires an applicant to demonstrate some extraordinary danger. See RULES OF THE CITY OF N.Y. tit. 38, §§ 5-01 to -04 (2007) (link).
73
As I have demonstrated elsewhere, there is considerable evidence that New York‘s restrictive
permit system has been an important part of its ability to drive violent crime down after the crime-spike
period. See Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 39–40.
74
Cf. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821 (―The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether
the right is really worth insisting upon.‖).
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II. McDonald v. City of Chicago: The Second Amendment Made
Clearer, the Fourteenth Amendment Made Murky
Joyce Lee Malcolm
Ironically, the landmark Supreme Court decision in McDonald v. City
of Chicago75 resolved one important question, the right of individuals to be
armed, but managed to spawn an even more fundamental one, the proper
standard for incorporation. Two years ago in District of Columbia v. Heller
the Court recognized the Second Amendment‘s protection of an individual
right ―to keep and bear arms,‖76 and now, in McDonald, the Court has incorporated the Second Amendment as a right that must be recognized by
the states.77 These decisions were a triumph for adherence to the popular
understanding at the time of the amendment‘s inclusion in the Bill of Rights
and its acceptance as a fundamental principle of American liberty. Yet,
apart from the anticipated impact on gun laws that will be considered below, the conflicting approaches to incorporation so glaring in the McDonald
opinions go to the core of our constitutional system. Before replying to
Professor Rosenthal‘s misgivings about the practical implications of the
McDonald decision, this response considers the issues of how to incorporate the Second Amendment and the appropriate standard for incorporation.
In considering the basis for incorporation, the Justices were seriously
divided on what the proper means should be. Justice Alito, writing for the
majority, employs the long-accepted approach of incorporating the
Amendment through the Due Process Clause.78 Justice Thomas agrees that
the Second Amendment should be incorporated, but writes a lengthy and
compelling opinion insisting, as petitioners urged, that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause is the appropriate means for incorporation.79 And Justice Stevens, in his dissent, sidesteps the clear case for incorporation by devising an amorphous new standard for it—one the Second Amendment fails
to meet—under a version of the Due Process Clause that he dubs the ―liberty clause.‖80 This brief Essay is not the place to explore fully the implications of these conflicting approaches for Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, but I consider them briefly before turning to the appropriatelevel-of-scrutiny aspect of the McDonald decision. I hope to reassure Pro75

130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (link).
128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799 (2008) (link).
77
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050.
78
Id. at 3036. Justice Alito was joined in the majority opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Kennedy, and Justice Scalia. Id. at 3026. Justice Scalia also authored a separate concurring opinion. Id.
at 3050. Justice Thomas concurred in part and in the judgment but wrote a separate opinion. Id. at
3020.
79
See id. at 3088 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
80
See id. at 3091–3104, 3109–10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer was joined in his dissent
by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor.
76

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/24/

98

NO RT HW E ST ER N U NI VE RST Y L AW RE VIEW C O LLOQ UY

fessor Rosenthal about any potential harm to the ―stop and frisk‖ tactic he
finds essential in combating gang violence.
A.
The debate over the proper means for incorporation begins with the
McDonald petitioners‘ argument for incorporating the Second Amendment
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than the Due Process
Clause—although the issue likely would have arisen anyway.81 Alito and
three concurring Justices are unwilling to make that shift. ―For many decades, the question of the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
against state infringement has been analyzed under the Due Process Clause
of that Amendment,‖ Alito writes.82 ―We therefore decline to disturb the
Slaughter-House holding.‖83 The Justices are not only concerned with disturbing precedent, but also uncertain about the scope of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.84 In addition to recounting the historical evidence that
an individual right to be armed is ―so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,‖85 the opinion provides a history of evolving standards for incorporation. Justice Alito points out that,
beginning in the 1960s, ―the Court abandoned ‗the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down, subjective
version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights‘‖86 and no longer
asked ―whether any ‗civilized system [can] be imagined that would not accord the particular protection.‘‖87 The modern standard for incorporation is
simply whether the guarantee in question ―is fundamental to our scheme of
ordered liberty and system of justice.‖88
By contrast, Justice Thomas‘s opinion, while providing a moving account of the atrocities perpetrated against disarmed blacks and abolitionists,
as well as the acceptance of the fundamental nature of the right to be armed,
makes a compelling case for incorporation under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. ―I cannot agree,‖ he writes, ―that [the Second Amendment
right] is enforceable against the States through a clause that speaks only to
‗process.‘‖89 ―The notion that a constitutional provision that guarantees only ‗process‘ before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property could de81

See Petitioners‘ Brief at 9–65, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 081521) (link).
82
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030–31 (majority opinion).
83
Id. at 3031.
84
Id. at 3030.
85
Id. at 3032 (quoting Synder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
86
Id. at 3035 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964)).
87
Id. at 3034 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968)). Many American rights
such as separation of church and state, the prohibition against double jeopardy, and the latitude permitted in freedom of speech are distinct from rights recognized in other western countries.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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fine the substance of those rights strains credulity for even the most casual
user of words.‖90 Where the majority finds the Privileges or Immunities
Clause too vague,91 Thomas finds the Due Process Clause equally problematic: ―While this Court has at times concluded that a right gains ‗fundamental‘ status only if it is essential to the American ‗scheme of ordered
liberty‘ or ‗―deeply rooted in this Nation‘s history and tradition‘ . . . the
Court has just as often held that a right warrants Due Process Clause protection if it satisfies a far less measurable range of criteria . . . .‖92 Justice
Thomas concludes that the Second Amendment is ―fully applicable to the
States,‖ but he does so ―because the right to keep and bear arms is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment as a privilege of American citizenship.‖93
The Stevens dissent moves into a different realm. Since historical evidence would lead him to support incorporation, he damns its use, proclaiming that ―a rigid historical methodology is unfaithful to the Constitution‘s
command.‖94 This is especially strange for a Justice who relied upon the
historical method in Heller to refute the notion that the Second Amendment
guaranteed an individual right.95 But Justice Stevens goes even further, cutting judges free from the text and intent of the Constitution by insisting that
the historical approach ―is unfaithful to the expansive principle Americans
laid down when they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and to the level of
generality they chose when they crafted its language.‖96 Since he refuses to
consider the history of ratification, one wonders where he got the odd notion that Americans wanted the Fourteenth Amendment to embody ―an expansive principle,‖ rather than focusing on venerable constitutional rights.
Stevens adds that the historical approach ―masks the value judgments that
pervade any analysis of what customs, defined in what manner, are sufficiently ‗rooted‘ . . . [and] effaces this Court‘s distinctive role in saying what
the law is, leaving the development and safekeeping of liberty to majoritarian political processes.‖97 Justice Scalia objects vehemently to this view of
objectivity and subjectivity:
The subjective nature of Justice Stevens‘ standard is also
apparent from his claim that it is the [C]ourt‘s prerogative—indeed their duty—to update the Due Process Clause
90

Id. at 3062.
See id. at 3030 (majority opinion).
92
Id. at 3061–62 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)) (citation omitted).
93
Id. at 3088.
94
Id. at 3098 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95
See Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History: District of Columbia v.
Heller, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1377, 1378–79 (2009) (link).
96
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3098 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97
Id. at 3098–99 (quotation marks omitted).
91
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so that it encompasses new freedoms the Framers were too
narrow-minded to imagine. Courts, he proclaims, must ‗do
justice to [the Clause‘s] urgent call and its open texture‘ by
exercising the ‗interpretive discretion the latter embodies‘ .
. . And it would be ‗judicial abdication‘ for a judge to . . .
‗outsourc[e]‘ the job to ‗historical sentiment.‘98
Having rejected any examination of the historical approach, Justice
Stevens resorts to a lengthy linguistic analysis of the words ―liberty‖ and
―incorporation.‖99 Indeed, not until page twenty-seven of his dissent does
he actually turn to a consideration of the Second Amendment.100 Stevens
then reverts, for this one amendment, to those approaches to incorporation
that Justice Alito explains were discarded by the Court fifty years earlier:
that the right incorporated ―need not be identical in shape or scope to the
rights protected against Federal Government infringement by the various
provisions of the Bill of Rights;‖101 that as ―local differences are to be cherished as elements of liberty,‖102 judges must be concerned about ―unduly
restricting the States‘ ‗broad latitude in experimenting‘‖103; and, lastly, that
judges need to consider whether the right under scrutiny is one that ―other
civilized societies‖ recognize as central to liberty.104 In any event, Justice
Stevens frankly refuses to accept the Court‘s holding in Heller, claiming it
―sheds no light on the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.‖105 To Stevens, the Second Amendment ―still serves the structural function of protecting the States from encroachment by an overreaching Federal Government.‖106 In his view, it is, in fact, a federal provision
with no individual-right aspect related to self-defense.107
Justice Breyer, concurring with the dissenters, argues for an additional
requirement for incorporation: popular consensus.108 Justice Alito rejects
this proposition out of hand, writing ―We have never held that a provision
of the Bill of Rights applies to the States only if there is a ‗popular consen98
Id. at 3051–52 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Scalia‘s opinion is primarily
devoted to refuting Justice Stevens‘ novel approach to Fourteenth Amendment incorporation rather than
Justice Stevens‘ treatment of the Second Amendment. Id. at 3051–56.
99
See id. at 3090–3101 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100
See id. at 3103.
101
Id. at 3093.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 3100 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977)).
104
See id. at 3096.
105
Id. at 3090. It seems surprising that a case about the meaning of one amendment should be regarded as remiss for not shedding light on another. Stevens finds no need for what he characterizes as
―jot-for-jot incorporation‖ of an amendment. See id. at 3095.
106
Id. at 3111.
107
See id. at 3106–07 & n.33, 3112–13 & nn.41–42.
108
See id. at 3124 (Breyer, J., dissenting). A ―popular‖ consensus carries the implication of a current, even ephemeral, view.
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sus‘ that the right is fundamental, and we see no basis for such a rule.‖109
Although, Justice Alito adds that in this instance there is evidence of such a
consensus since 58 members of the Senate and 251 members of the House
submitted an amicus brief in support of incorporation and 38 states submitted another.110
To summarize, the Court has given us three distinct means for incorporation: (1) the now customary Due Process Clause; (2) the more historically
accurate Privileges or Immunities Clause; and (3) Justice Stevens‘ novel
―Liberty Clause.‖ Justice Breyer‘s ―popular consensus‖ approach is arguably a fourth method. Justice Scalia particularly takes issue with Stevens‘
approach because it reverts, at least for the Second Amendment, to separating rights into different classes. It would leave judges, rather than the Constitution and the political process, as the propounders of what is or is not a
fundamental right. Although the issue may seem of minor importance since
nearly all the Bill of Rights amendments have been incorporated already,
there is a universe of other ―liberties‖ the Court might in the future decide
are fundamental rights. Justice Scalia finds great danger in Stevens‘ vision
of the role of the Court:
Justice Stevens abhors a system in which ‗majorities or
powerful interest groups always get their way,‘ but replaces
it with a system in which unelected and life-tenured judges
always get their way. That such usurpation is effected unabashedly . . . makes it even worse. In a vibrant democracy, usurpation should have to be accomplished in the dark.
It is Justice Stevens‘ approach, not the Court‘s, that puts
democracy in peril.111
Scalia‘s warning about the hazard to our constitutional system posed
by Justice Stevens‘ approach is well taken. Stevens‘ approach would free
judges from the restraint of legal precedent and constitutional text. It would
give unelected judges license to indulge their personal views with little regard for the Constitution or the legal system they swear to uphold. It is little comfort that none of the other Justices joined Stevens in this last opinion
of his tenure on the Court.
B.
Now, this Essay turns to the McDonald decision and the serious question of the appropriate level of scrutiny for Second Amendment rights.
Since fundamental rights are not to be separated into first- and second-class
109
110
111

Id. at 3049 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 3058 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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status, the strict scrutiny applied to the First Amendment freedom of the
press and freedom of speech should also be applied to Second Amendment
rights.112 All rights have some restrictions, and the Second Amendment is
no different. Indeed, the Heller opinion explicitly acknowledged that and
suggested that nothing in the opinion ―should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places
such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.‖113 As Professor Rosenthal
correctly notes, beyond this disclaimer, the Heller Court did not squarely
deal with the term ―infringed‖ in the Amendment‘s text.114 In Heller, it was
not a significant issue. Nonetheless, Justice Scalia assured in his opinion in
Heller that the Court is not ignorant of the handgun violence in this country.115 But, as Justice Scalia put it, ―the enshrinement of constitutional
rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table. These include
the absolute prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the
home.‖116 The Court also emphasized that the District of Columbia has
many constitutional options to combat the problem.117
In that light, the regulations put in place by Washington, D.C. after the
Heller Court overturned its gun ban are clearly designed to achieve the
same result as the former ban by making the procedures for registering a
handgun in the city as onerous as possible.118 An applicant must go through
two background checks, make four visits to the police department, provide
fingerprints, a photo, and a job history, pass a twenty-question test on D.C.
firearms laws, pass a five-hour class with a trainer selected from a list the
city provides, including one hour on a gun range (the city doesn‘t have one
nor will it permit a gun shop or gun sales in city limits), and pay $300 in
fees, after all of which the gun must be taken back to the police and fired
for a ballistic test.119 As of 2011, a gun must be equipped with a special
112
See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of Law v. Martinez,
___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2987–88 (2010) (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270, 276
(1981)) (applying strict scrutiny in the context of regulating religious speech) (link); Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm‘n, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (applying strict scrutiny to assess laws
burdening political speech) (link). Not all restrictions on speech are reviewed under a strict scrutiny
standard. See R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–84 (1992) (holding that strict scrutiny should not
be applied to challenge of regulation of obscene or defamatory speech) (link).
113
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816–17 (2008).
114
See supra p. 92; cf. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797–99 (discussing the portion of the Second Amendment which establishes that the right shall not be infringed, but declining to analyze the word ―infringed‖).
115
See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822.
116
Id. (emphasis added).
117
See id.
118
For a description of the new regulations, see Gary Fields, Washington’s New Gun Rules Shift
Constitutional
Debate,
WSJ.COM,
May
17,
2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704093204575216680860962548.html (link).
119
Id.
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identification technology that has not yet been adopted by the industry.120
The registration expires after three years, and if it lapses the police may seize the gun and the owner is subject to up to one year in jail and fined
$1000.121
Likewise, Chicago passed a new ordinance four days after the Supreme
Court overturned its gun ban. The new rule permits residents to own a
handgun in the home but imposes serious restrictions and a series of bureaucratic hurdles intended to discourage ownership.122 Gun shops are
banned in the city, as are all firearms sales.123 The registrant must pass a
four-hour class, spend an hour on a gun range (the city bans gun ranges),
and transport the gun ―broken down,‖ unloaded, and in a case.124 The owner
must keep the gun inside a building; it is illegal to take it into a garage or to
bring it onto a porch or to a yard.125 Each gun must be registered within five
days of purchase.126 The first test of the McDonald decision will be these
new municipal regulations that are seemingly designed to circumvent citizens‘ lawful right to keep a handgun in their homes for self-defense. Five
days before the new Chicago gun regulation went into effect, a federal lawsuit had already been filed against the city.127
C.
As to further tests of the McDonald decision, Professor Rosenthal has
particular anxieties. Are they justified? Is Professor Rosenthal correct that
not only allowing law-abiding residents of Chicago to have firearms in their
homes, but granting them the right to carry weapons, would severely hamper the effectiveness of the city‘s ―stop and frisk‖ strategies—with dire results?128 Indeed, Professor Rosenthal raises the specter that this would
produce an escalating homicide rate and also ―could enable urban street
gangs to act as occupying armies.‖129 He even envisions a world where
gangs could commit no overt crimes in police officers‘ presence and in turn

120

Id.
Id.
122
See Chicago’s New Gun Law Goes into Effect Today, CHICAGOBREAKINGNEWS.COM, July 12,
2010, http://www.chicagobreakingnews.com/2010/07/chicagos-new-gun-law-goes-into-effect-today.html
(link).
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
See Duaa Eldeib & Dahleen Glanton, Plaintiffs Aim to Shoot Down Chicago’s Gun Ordinance,
CHICAGOBREAKINGNEWS.COM, July 7, 2010, http://www.chicagobreakingnews.com/2010/07/lawsuitfiled-against-chicagos-new-gun-ordinance.html (link).
128
See supra pp. 88–89.
129
See supra p. 89.
121
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use ―their ability to go about armed‖ in order to ―establish criminal ministates based on drug trafficking . . . .‖130
Calm reflection is called for to put the situation in context. The city of
Chicago has banned residents from keeping handguns, rifles and shotguns
for their defense since 1982, some eighteen years.131 But as Justice Alito
reminds us, that has not made Otis McDonald or others living in what are
still high-crime areas safer.132 Chicago‘s prohibition has not swept guns
from the city. It has only succeeded in disarming those who obey the law,
leaving them vulnerable to thugs who have no intention of registering their
guns. Although the police are free to ―stop and frisk‖ those they suspect of
criminal intent, the number of Chicago homicide victims this year equaled
the number of American soldiers killed during the same period in Afghanistan and Iraq together.133 In fact, two Illinois legislators representing Chicago districts called on the governor of the state to deploy the National Guard
to patrol the city streets.134
The 1976 District of Columbia gun ban overturned by the Heller decision was no more successful. A study comparing the District with fortynine other major cities found the District‘s homicide rate substantially higher relative to those cities than it had been before its gun ban was passed.135
However, as Justice Breyer notes, other scholarship has shown that ownership of a handgun increases public safety.136
While forty states presently permit law-abiding residents who fulfill
certain requirements to carry a concealed weapon, Professor Rosenthal can
take heart from the fact that firearms crime on the whole has not risen. This
permissive approach to gun possession has not unleashed a rash of shootouts; the nation‘s homicide rate has been declining for more than thirty
years.137 Although gun ownership surged in 2009,138 the FBI crime report

130

See supra p. 89.
See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010).
132
Id. at 3049.
133
See id.
134
Id.
135
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2857–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer
included this information in his dissent, nevertheless insisting that although the gun ban had left city residents even more at risk, that did not mean they should have the right to guns in their homes for protection. Id. at 2859.
136
See id. at 2858.
137
For the impact on crime of permitting law-abiding citizens to carry concealed firearms, see JOHN
R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN CONTROL LAWS (3d ed.
2010).
138
Chris McGreal, Americans Stick to Their Guns as Firearms Sales Surge, GUARDIAN. CO.UK,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/13/guns-nra-america-obama-virginia, Apr. 13, 2009 (link);
Peter Schworm & Matt Carroll, Gun Permits Surge in State, BOSTONGLOBE.COM,
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/12/20/gun_permits_surge_in_state/,
Dec. 20, 2009 (link).
131
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for that year shows crime rates dropped across America.139 Firearms in the
hands of lawful citizens can and do deter would-be assailants.140 Success, of
course, has many fathers, but Professor Rosenthal would have you believe
the power of police to stop and frisk people on the street was the sole cause
for this decline. An article in the Christian Science Monitor suggests six
reasons why serious crime has been in decline—of which ―proactive‖ policing is only one—and includes a variety of approaches to reducing crime in
addition to frisking.141
One rather strained concern Professor Rosenthal raises involves the use
of the word ―well regulated‖ in the Second Amendment‘s militia clause.142
He notes that ―the [Heller] Court breezed past‖ the adjective ―wellregulated,‖ dismissing it as ―impl[ying] nothing more than the imposition of
proper discipline and training.‖143 Quite right. They did breeze by it and it
does merely mean ―well-trained.‖ A militia that is not well-trained is more
dangerous than useful. However, while the militia was, with certain exceptions, drawn from the entire population of citizens, the well-trained and
drilled militia included only those physically fit men between the ages of
eighteen and forty-five.144 But since the text merely describes the militia as
―well-regulated,‖ Professor Rosenthal argues that the Second Amendment,
―construed in light of the preamble,‖ gives government the authority to subject the larger group—the unorganized militia—to ―proper training and discipline,‖ thereby giving the government ―comprehensive regulation of all
who possess and carry firearms.‖145 He goes on to posit that such an approach explains the Court‘s acceptance of regulations—such as concealed
weapons prohibitions—that would otherwise seem to infringe on the right
to possess firearms.146
Professor Rosenthal gets an ―A‖ for invention, but this interpretation is
not credible. It waives aside the acknowledged fact that no right is absolute
and that therefore laws that in some way restricted the right to be armed by
prohibiting unsafe use before the adoption of the Second Amendment were
not regarded as infringing on the core right. His reference to an argument
limiting regulations to those of the 18th century is, he admits, ―inconsistent
with Heller‘s dicta,‖ or, one might add, common sense.147 But he nevertheless tethers his argument for the government‘s (necessary) regulatory au139
Husna Haq, US Crime Rate Is Down: Six Key Reasons, CSMONITOR.COM, May 24, 2010,
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0524/US-crime-rate-is-down-six-key-reasons (link).
140
See LOTT, supra note 137, at 56–99.
141
See Haq, supra note 139.
142
See supra text accompanying note 48.
143
See supra text accompanying note 48.
144
See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN
RIGHT 138–40 (1994).
145
See supra p. 92.
146
See supra 92–93.
147
See supra at 93.
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thority to the Second Amendment‘s ―well-regulated militia‖ reference.
That analysis is a bucket that will not hold water.
D.
To conclude, the McDonald decision has incorporated the Second
Amendment right as a core right, not a second-class, watered down version
that can be effectively thwarted by state or city action. Are reasonable
regulations ―interest-balancing‖? If so, then reasonable regulations of all
core rights are interest-balancing. Are there dangers in granting lawful citizens a right to keep and bear arms? Yes, but there are dangers in every
right. As the English jurist Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained in a 1985
opinion, ―[i]t is implicit in a genuine right that its exercise may work
against (some facet of) the public interest: a right to speak only where its
exercise advanced the public welfare or public policy . . . would be a hollow
guarantee against repression.‖148 The experience of a majority of states,
however, has shown that honoring the right of the people to keep and bear
arms does in fact protect life.

148

See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, GUNS AND VIOLENCE: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE 255 (2004) (citing
Wheeler v. Leicester City Council (1985) A.C. 1054 (HL) (Eng.)).
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III. Second Amendment Plumbing After McDonald: A Reply to
Professor Malcolm
Lawrence Rosenthal
Joyce Malcolm worries about some things and not others. She is concerned about what she regards as the historical inaccuracy of all of the opinions but Justice Thomas‘s in McDonald v. City of Chicago,149 but she is
supremely confident that her vigorous conception of Second Amendment
rights will not lead to chaos in the inner city. I am afraid that she rather has
things backwards.
A.
Let us start with Professor Malcolm‘s assessment of McDonald. She
commends Justice Thomas‘s opinion, which, she tells us, ―makes a compelling case for incorporation [of the Second Amendment] under the Privileges
or Immunities Clause.‖150 She tells us that this approach, of those taken by
the various opinions in McDonald, is ―the more historically accurate.‖151 In
the opinion that Professor Malcolm finds so compelling, Justice Thomas
tells us that ―constitutional provisions are ‗written to be understood by the
voters.‘ Thus, the objective of this inquiry is to discern what ‗ordinary citizens‘ at the time of ratification would have understood the Privileges or
Immunities Clause to mean.‖152 After reviewing the historical evidence,
Justice Thomas concludes that ―the ratifying public understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect constitutionally enumerated rights,
including the right to keep and bear arms.‖153 Justice Thomas did indeed
make a compelling case, if only because he so assiduously overlooked virtually all of the historical evidence inconsistent with his conclusion.
I have elsewhere canvassed the confusing and conflicting evidence on
the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Privileges or Immunities Clause.154 I will not repeat that discussion here, but it is worth noting
some of Justice Thomas‘s most remarkable omissions. If, for example, the
public understood that the Fourteenth Amendment made all constitutionally
149

130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (link).
Supra p. 99.
151
Supra p. 102.
152
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3063 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(citations and internal quotations omitted) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788
(2008)).
153
Id. at 3077.
154
See Lawrence Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets the Fourteenth Amendment: Original
Public Meaning and the Problem of Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 361, 365–400 (2009)
[hereinafter Rosenthal, New Originalism]; Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After
Heller: Of Standards of Scrutiny, Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41
URB. LAW. 1, 48–78 (2009) [hereinafter Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller].
150
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enumerated rights binding on the states, one might expect some effort in the
ratifying states to make their own laws consistent with these enumerated
rights. Yet, ratification produced no effort to bring state laws into conformity with the Bill of Rights.155 In particular, ratification did nothing to halt
a trend in the states toward prosecution by information, despite its inconsistency with the Fifth Amendment‘s Grand Jury Clause.156 This is not what
one would expect had there been a general understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment had rendered all enumerated constitutional rights applicable to the states. About this historical evidence, Justice Thomas offers
no comment.
Justice Thomas also notes that three framing-era treatises indicated
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated constitutionally enumerated rights against the states. 157 Yet, Justice Thomas ignores significant
ambiguities and errors in those treatises and fails to mention that other
leading treatises of the era found no incorporationist meaning in the
Fourteenth Amendment.158 Again, if there had been a general understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Second Amendment
and other constitutional rights previously protected against only the federal government applicable to the states, surely it is remarkable that
leading legal scholars of the day such as Joel Prentiss Bishop, Thomas
Cooley, John Forrest Dillon, and Francis Wharton somehow did not get
the message.159
As for judicial discussions of the Fourteenth Amendment in the
wake of ratification, Justice Thomas tells us that one lower court, in a
decision ―written by a future Justice of this Court,‖ wrote an opinion
embracing incorporation, 160 while leaving unmentioned two other framing-era decisions to the contrary. 161 Even more striking, Justice Thomas
was evidently unconcerned that those actually sitting on the Court, in a
series of framing-era cases, rejected an incorporationist reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 162 In United States v. Cruikshank,163 for example,
155

See Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 82–84 (1949).
156
See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, The Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights, and the (First) Criminal
Procedure Revolution, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 469, 478–90 (2009); George C. Thomas III, The
Riddle of the Fourteenth Amendment: A Response to Professor Wildenthal, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1627, 1633,
1654–55 (2007).
157
130 S. Ct. at 3076 & n.14.
158
See Rosenthal, New Originalism, supra note 154, at 395–400.
159
See id. at 399–400.
160
130 S. Ct. at 3076 (citing United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 82 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No.
15,282) (Woods, J.)).
161
See United States v. Crosby, 25 F. Cas. 701, 704 (C.C.D. S.C. 1871) (No. 14,893); Rowan v.
State, 30 Wis. 129, 148–50 (1872).
162
See Rosenthal, New Originalism, supra note 154, at 391–95; Rosenthal, Second Amendment
Plumbing After Heller, supra note 154, at 68–72.
163
92 U.S. 542 (1876) (link).
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the Court found infirm counts of an indictment alleging violations of the
right to keep and bear arms, brought under the Enforcement Act of 1870,
which prohibited conspiracies to ―hinder . . . free exercise and enjoyment of
any right or privilege . . . secured . . . by the constitution or laws of the United States,‖164 writing: ―The second amendment declares that it shall not be
infringed; but this, as has been seen, means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress.‖165 The Cruikshank Court added that nondiscrimination was the animating principle of the Fourteenth Amendment: ―The
equality of the rights of citizens is a principle of republicanism. . . . The only
obligation resting upon the United States is to see that the States do not deny
the right. This the amendment guarantees, but no more.‖166
For his part, Justice Thomas acknowledged that his view was inconsistent with Cruikshank and other framing-era precedents of the Supreme
Court.167 Yet he failed to consider whether the framing-era Court‘s take on
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment undermined his own assessment
of the historical evidence of original meaning.168 It is curious, to say the
least, that Justice Thomas gave more weight to the view of ―a future Justice‖ than the views of those actually serving on the Court.169 Justice Thomas‘s disdain for the views of the framing-era Supreme Court is even more
inexplicable when one considers that he had several years earlier joined an
opinion affording special deference to the Court‘s framing-era decisions interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment due to ―the insight attributable to the
Members of the Court at that time,‖ since they ―obviously had intimate
knowledge and familiarity with the events surrounding the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment.‖170
164

Id. at 548 (quoting Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 6, 16 Stat. 141 (1870)).
Id at 553.
166
Id. at 555.
167
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3084–86 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
168
The only Members of the Court who expressed an incorporationist understanding in the framing
era were Justice Bradley and Justice Swayne, in the former‘s dissenting opinion in the Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 112–19 (1872) (link). Yet, by the time of Cruikshank, even these Justices
had abandoned incorporation.
169
In his opinion, Justice Thomas suggested that the Court‘s holding in Cruikshank undermined the
efforts of the Reconstruction-era Congress to protect the newly freed slaves from violence, see McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3086–88, but hostility to the objectives of Reconstruction seems an unlikely explanation for the Court‘s approach to the Fourteenth Amendment since by the time of Cruikshank, eight of the
nine Justices had been appointed by Presidents Lincoln or Grant. See DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR.,
THE WAITE COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 12 tbl. 1.2 (2003). Moreover, within a few years,
the Court held that the exclusion of African-Americans from juries violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (link). This holding was not a foregone conclusion;
in the parlance of the day, jury service was considered a political and not a civil right, and many understood the Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee equality only with respect to the latter. See, e.g.,
Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Scholarship and Commentary on the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1867–1873, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 153, 266–67 (2009).
170
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 622 (2000) (link).
165
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My point is not that the preponderance of the historical evidence tilts
against incorporation. My own view is that the historical evidence is sufficiently near equipoise, and sufficiently fragmentary and unreliable, that it
provides no satisfactory basis for resolution of the incorporation debate. 171
For present purposes, however, the important point is that Justice Thomas‘s
opinion in McDonald—and Professor Malcolm‘s eager embrace of it—is
rather an argument against originalist constitutional adjudication. Much has
been written of the dangers of ―law office history,‖ in which historical evidence of original meaning is assessed with an advocate‘s jaundiced eye that
cherry-picks only the evidence supporting a predetermined conclusion.172
Justice Thomas‘s opinion is a pretty good example of the problem. Any
case looks easy if one looks to only the evidence in favor of one‘s preferred
conclusion.
B.
Professor Malcolm, while advocating ―strict scrutiny‖ for firearms
regulations,173 seems unconcerned with what this may mean for firearms
violence in the inner city because ―the nation‘s homicide rate has been
declining for more than thirty years,‖174 and a reporter for the Christian
Science Monitor assures her that there are six reasons for the crime decline ―of which ‗proactive‘ policing is only one—and includes a variety
of approaches to reducing crime in addition to frisking.‖175 For those
who take their criminology from sources other than the Christian
Science Monitor, however, there is cause for concern.
Professor Malcolm‘s account of homicide rates in recent decades is
flat-out wrong; as I have explained elsewhere, there was an enormous
and unprecedented spike in homicide and other forms of violent crime in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, concentrated in firearms-related crime in
disadvantaged inner-city communities, as a consequence of the violent
competition following the introduction of crack cocaine.176 The crimerise period was followed by a crime decline reaching levels not seen in
nearly four decades, 177 and had no evident demographic or economic explanation.178 Professor Malcolm seems to favor John Lott‘s theory that
the prevalence of laws permitting the carrying of concealed weapons
171
See Rosenthal, New Originalism, supra note 154, at 401–08; Rosenthal, Second Amendment
Plumbing After Heller, supra note 154, at 75–78.
172
See, e.g., Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119,
155–58; Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387, 402–07 (2003);
John Philip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193, 197–204 (1993).
173
See supra pp. 102–03.
174
Supra p. 105 & n.137.
175
Supra p. 106 & n.141.
176
See Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller, supra note 154, at 7–20.
177
See id. at 7.
178
See id. at 23.
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stimulated crime declines, 179 but as I noted in my opening essay, there
are serious methodological challenges to Lott‘s work.180 In any event,
Lott himself makes no claim that any significant portion of the crime drop
since the early 1990s can be attributed to concealed-carry laws.181 And, as I
also noted in my opening essay, the ability to carry firearms offers no guarantee of effective self-defense, at least in unstable urban neighborhoods.
Members of criminal street gangs carry firearms at vastly elevated levels
compared to the general population, yet they also have vastly elevated homicide victimization rates.182 More guns do not always mean less crime.
Consider New York City, which had violent crime rates typical of
other large cities in 1990, but in the succeeding decade achieved crime
declines of about double those in the rest of the country, and which outperformed each of the nation‘s fifteen largest cities. 183 There is much
evidence that the decline resulted from escalation in stop-and-frisk tactics associated with enforcement of New York‘s tough gun-control
laws.184 Those laws are indeed stringent; New York rarely issues permits
authorizing the possession or carrying of handguns, and for that reason,
its laws have been characterized as imposing an effective handgun
ban.185 Thus, a regulatory regime nearly as rigorous as that invalidated
in Heller—and quite different than that advocated by Lott—when
coupled with aggressive stop-and-frisk tactics, has the best record in the
country when it comes to reducing big-city violent crime. 186
179

See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
See supra note 68.
181
See LOTT, supra note 137, at 253–305.
182
See supra note 68.
183
See Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller, supra note 154, at 25–26.
184
See id. at 26–44. Although she does not comment on New York, Professor Malcolm points to
high crime rates in the District of Columbia and Chicago to suggest that handgun bans are ineffective.
See supra notes 133–135 and accompanying text. Aside from ignoring the fact that the manner in which
a handgun ban is enforced is surely more important than the fact that it is on the books, the evidence on
the efficacy of handgun bans is actually mixed, as Justice Breyer has observed. See McDonald v. City
of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3127 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting); District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.
Ct. 2783, 2857–61 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (link). For a quite different assessment than that of
Professor Malcolm of the evidence relating to Chicago, offered by professional criminologists, see Brief
and Appendix of Professors of Criminal Justice as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, McDonald,
130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521) (link).
185
See Jesse Matthew Ruhl, Arthur L. Rizer III & Mikel J. Wier, Gun Control: Targeting Rationality in a Loaded Debate, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 413, 449–50 (2004) (link).
186
In fairness, it should be noted that a report of New York‘s Attorney General based on a review
of forms officers must file when conducting forcible stops expresses some skepticism about the New
York Police Department‘s compliance with the Fourth Amendment, concluding through the use of a
sampling procedure that 15.4% of all forms failed to articulate facts sufficient to justify the stop and
23.5% of all forms did not provide sufficient information to make a determination about whether the
stop was justified. See CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF THE STATE OF N.Y.,
THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT‘S ―STOP AND FRISK‖ PRACTICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE
OF NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 161–64 (1999). The sampling procedure
180
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C.
As for her advocacy of strict scrutiny, 187 although she never bothers
to explain how her proposal for strict scrutiny of firearms regulations
can be squared with Heller‘s list of ―presumptively lawful regulatory
measures,‖188 Professor Malcolm claims that my reliance on the Second
Amendment‘s preamble as a source of regulatory authority ―is a bucket
that will not hold water.‖189 She does not, however, actually get around
to giving a reason to support this conclusion.
As I explained in my opening essay, if one were to consult no more
than the original meaning of the Second Amendment‘s operative clause,
there would seem to be no power to limit the right to possess and carry
firearms in common civilian use.190 Nor is framing-era practice much
help; although Professor Malcolm claims that ―laws that in some way restricted the right to be armed by prohibiting unsafe use before the ado ption of the Second Amendment were not regarded as infringing on the
core right,‖191 in Heller, the Court concluded that there was little framingera support for firearms regulation aside from laws addressing gunpowder
storage and the discharge of firearms.192 Such regulations seem entirely
compatible with the operative clause‘s protection of a right to possess and
carry firearms in common use—unlike many of the other prohibitions
deemed presumptively lawful in Heller. Professor Malcolm, in short, has

also found that forms that articulated facts amounting to reasonable suspicion were four times more likely to result in an arrest. See id. at 164. It is difficult to know what to make of this point; it may well be
that officers were less thorough in filling out forms when they knew there would be no criminal case
arising from the encounter. Reliance on these reports to assess compliance with the Fourth Amendment
is perilous since the reports are not made for that purpose, but rather as a source of investigative leads.
See James J. Fyfe, Stops, Frisks, Searches, and the Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 376,
392–94 (2004). In any event, this data does not endeavor to establish that police reports involving arrests based on probable cause were any more likely to fail to articulate sufficient facts to support the arrest than reports involving stops. At most, the data may reflect no more than the risk of error inherent in
all police activity.
187
The basis for Professor Malcolm‘s view seems to be that ―fundamental rights are not to be separated into first- and second-class status,‖ and therefore ―the strict scrutiny applied to the First Amendment freedom of the press and freedom of speech should also be applied to Second Amendment rights.‖
Supra pp. 102–03. Yet, as Professor Malcolm acknowledges, in many contexts, First Amendment jurisprudence does not require strict scrutiny. See supra p. 103 n.112; see also Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing
the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 695 (2007). For a particularly clear example, see Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798–800 & n.6 (1989). Professor Malcolm offers no explanation as to why strict scrutiny should be invariably applied in Second Amendment jurisprudence when
that is not the case within First Amendment jurisprudence. Beyond that, as I explained in my opening
essay, there are important differences between First and Second Amendment rights that bear on the appropriate standard of scrutiny. See supra note 32.
188
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 n.26.
189
Supra p. 107.
190
See supra p. 87.
191
See supra p. 106.
192
See 128 S. Ct. at 2819–21.
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no textual explanation for the Heller dicta on permissible firearms regulation—dicta she nevertheless endorses.193
Nor does the rubric of ―strict scrutiny‖ explain Heller‘s discussion of
―presumptively lawful‖ gun-control measures. Even if some allowance for
regulations that pass searching judicial scrutiny could be squared with the
Second Amendment‘s text as Professor Malcolm reads it, strict scrutiny
does not ordinarily tolerate purely prophylactic regulation such as prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons justified as an effort to prevent violent
confrontations. In one of the First Amendment strict scrutiny cases that
Professor Malcolm cites, for example, the Court rejected an argument that a
statutory prohibition on corporate-funded electioneering could be justified
as a means to prevent corruption because the prohibition swept beyond the
type of corrupt quid-pro-quo that the government has a compelling interest
in preventing.194 If we are to take strict scrutiny seriously, it is hard to understand how a ban on carrying concealed firearms could fare any better.
If, however, the Second Amendment‘s operative clause is construed in
light of the preamble‘s contemplation of a ―well regulated militia,‖ that is,
―the imposition of proper discipline and training‖ on not only those enrolled
in a formal military organization but instead all who are ―physically capable
of acting in concert for the common defense,‖195 then the Second Amendment envisions unusually comprehensive regulatory authority of the type
blessed in the Heller dicta.
The Second Amendment is, after all, a legal text. Surely an approach
to the Second Amendment standard of scrutiny that is compatible with the
text is preferable to one that is not. My own reliance on the Second
Amendment‘s preamble to establish a standard of scrutiny has a textual
foundation; Professor Malcolm‘s approach, as far as I can tell, has none.
I‘ll take mine.

193
194
195

See supra pp. 106–07.
See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 908–11 (2010).
128 S. Ct. at 2799, 2800 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/24/

114

